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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW1
The issues presented for review are:
1.

Whether a long-term lessee, who has unqualifiedly agreed to "maintain and

keep in repair (and . . . put into repair where necessary)" the roof of the leased premises,
is obligated to meet that obligation, even if replacement of the roof is required in order
to maintain the roof, or to keep or put the roof in sound condition?
2.

Whether a lessor is under a duty to repair or replace any portion of the

leased premises when the common law imposes no such duty and the controlling lease
agreement does not refer to any such obligation on the part of the lessor?
A trial court's determination as to whether the terms of a contract are ambiguous
is a question of law. Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). A trial
court's interpretation of an unambiguous, integrated contract is a question of law.
Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Group, 868 P.2d 110, 112 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). A trial court's determination as
to whether a party is entitled to summary judgment is also a question of law. Higgins v.
1

Defendants/Appellants have included issues in their Brief that were not set forth in
their Docketing Statement, and, in violation of Rule 24(a)(5), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, they have failed to cite to the record showing that their stated issues were
preserved in the trial court.
1

Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Geary, 869 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). These questions of law are reviewed
on appeal for correctness, without deference to the trial court's determinations. State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). Although the trial court's determinations as to
questions of law are accorded no deference, an appellate court "may affirm a grant of
summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied
on below." Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES.
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations
determinative of, or of central importance to, this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition
in the Court Below
Plaintiff/Appellant SLW/Utah, L.C. ("SLW") is in agreement with the description
by the Griffithses of the nature of the case, the course of the proceedings, and its
disposition in the trial court, as set forth under the heading "Statement of the Case" in
the Griffithses' Brief. Appellants' Brief, at 2-3.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Griffithses purchased a building on Orange Street in Salt Lake City,

Utah ("Orange Street Building") on January 2, 1985. Affidavit of Jerry W. Griffiths,
dated February 10, 1997 ("Jerry Griffiths (Second) Aff."), at 3, 1 9 (R. at 128).
2.

The Griffithses sold the Orange Street Building to Scott Schirmer

("Schirmer") and other investors on May 12, 1986. Purchase Agreement, Exhibit "A"
to Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, at 1 (R.
at 148); Jerry Griffiths (Second) Aff., at 3, 1 9 (R. at 128).
3.

The Purchase Agreement provides as follows:

It is a condition of this Agreement that at the time of closing the
Buyer, as landlord, and the Seller [Griffithses], as Tenant, will enter into
a lease of the Property . . . . Such lease shall provide that Seller shall be
entitled to receive any rent from any current existing leases and Seller shall
pay to Buyer a fixed guaranteed lease as provided in said Lease Agreement.
Purchase Agreement, at 16 (R. at 163).
4.

On the same date the Purchase Agreement was executed, SLW Properties2

and the Griffithses entered into a Lease Agreement (Exhibit "A" to Affidavit of Jerry W.
Griffiths, dated October 24, 1996) ("Jerry Griffiths (First) Aff.") (R. at 48-56), pursuant

2

The Appellee, SLW/Utah, L.C., is the entity created by the purchasers of the
Orange Street property to hold the real estate. Affidavit of Scott Schirmer ("Schirmer
Aff."), at 2 , 1 3 (R. at 91).
3

to which the Orange Street premises were leased to the Griffithses for fifteen years. Id.,
at 1, 1 1.2 (R. at 48).
5.

At the time of the purchase/sale and lease-back transaction, the roof on the

Orange Street Building was the original roof and was, at that time, approximately thirteen
years old. Jerry Griffiths (First) Aff., at 2, \ 5 (R. at 45); Affidavit of Carl R. Clark
("Clark Aff."), at 2-3, 1 8 (R. at 58-59).
6.

The original roof on the Orange Street Building had a maximum life

expectancy of twenty years. Clark Aff., at 2, \ 7 (R. at 158). Therefore, at the time the
Lease Agreement was entered into, the maximum remaimng life expectancy of the roof
was seven years.
7.

During the winter and spring of 1996, the roof of the Orange Street Building

was leaking. Jerry Griffiths (First) Aff., at 2, 1 7 (R. at 145).3
8.

As of February 1996, the roof was in such poor condition that piecemeal

repairs would not be sufficient to bring it into sound condition; the roof required total

3

SLW maintains the problems began developing with the roof in 1994 or 1995,
Schirmer Aff., at 4, 1 13 (R. at 93), and that on January 25, 1995, SLW caused a letter
to be sent to the Griffithses requesting that they replace the roof, or a major portion of
it, pursuant to their obligation under the Lease Agreement. Schirmer Aff. at 4, \ 14 (R.
at 94). Nevertheless, for purposes of this appeal, the sworn statements of Jerry Griffiths
concerning when the roof problems were first noticed — even if demonstrably false —
must be accepted as true. See, e.g., Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750,
752 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
4

restoration or replacement in order ior *: LO I,^ ^ i

r; or put into repair. Jerry

Griffiths (Fi-n • *

* - R. at 58).4

9.

•-

*

The Griffithses hired Clark's Roofing Co., Inc., to install a roof on the

Orange Street guying, which work was performed between February and April 1996.
Clark \ ff

at 2 3. 11! 5. 5 (]|[ [ it 58-59); Jerry Griffiths (First) A ff., t 3. If 1 1 (R .1

46).
111

.e unmixes paid for the work done by Clark's Roofing Company, Inc.,
*

"

^ \

The Lease Agreement unqualifiedly requires the Griffithses to maintain the
roof, to keep it in repair, and, where necessary, to put it In repair, ii.e unambiguous,
ijiitjtulliiial |irn\Mnii in 'iiiili! In I n| illii I i I .i \«reern

- "* K

4

" *"

:

In addition to the above, Tenant shall maintain and keep in repair (and shall put
into repair where necessary) the walls and roof of the building

.

Lease Agreement, at .
I he I ease / -cement also ronrirr; *Vr

.

ui the lease term, me

tenant shall surrender the premises "in as good condition as It was at the beginning of the
term, reasonable wear excepted." Lease Agreement, ^
4

i.

SLW agrees that repair of the entire roof was necessary as of 1996, and even
earlier. However, as the absence of any citation to the record by the Griffithses would
indicate, there is no support for the assertion in the Griffithses' Brief that "the roof over
the west portion of the premises failed completely." Appellants' Brief, at 5 r r
5

13.

The Lease Agreement does not provide that the lessor has any duty to

repair, ma^tain, keep in repair, or put into repair, the roof of the Orange Street Building
(R. at 48-56).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

The Trial Court Did Not Resort to Parol Evidence in Making its
Determination,

Contrary to the unfounded assertion of the Griffithses, the trial court did not utilize
parol evidence in reaching its determination that, under the terms of the Lease
Agreement, the Griffithses are obligated to take whatever measures are required,
including the renovation or replacement of the entire roof, to keep or put the roof in
repair. The trial court mad * it abundantly clear that parol c idence was unnecessary to
resolve the issues before it because of its determinations that "the lease was an integrated
contract" and "the critical language" contained in Article 4 of the Lease Agreement "was
unambiguous." Order, at 1 (R. at 194).
2.

The Trial Court Correctly Determined That the Griffithses are Obliged
Under the Terms of the Lease Agreement to Put the Roof Into Repair.
Even if the Required Work Goes Beyond Piecemeal Repairs,

Article 4 of the Lease Agreement requires the Griffithses to maintain the roof, to
"keep" the roof "in repair" and to "put" the roof "into repair" where necessary. The
plain language of the Lease Agreement obligates the Griffithses to keep and, where
necessary, put the roof into a state of good, sound, useful condition, without any
6

restriction or qualification as to what might be required to keep or put the roof in such
condition.
Bpcausf rrnnvfirioT it the entire runf, rather than simply piecemeal repairs, was
required in order to put the roof in repair, the Griffithses were required to have that work
done. Nowhere in the Lease Agreement does it say thw

irrithses can a\ old thei i: duty

* *v --\ -

oiecemeal repairs, is

required in order to get the job done.
The Griffithses had a duty to maintain the icoi, is- *;eep tne rocA In repair, and,
+

"

"• i~a:r Replacement

of .the roof was required in order to maintain the rui;f,

J :o ^eep or put the roof into

ilinv necessary, in pul Mir noof iiiln inuiir

Tin

repair. Therefore, the Griffithses had a duty to replace the roof.
3.

Neither the Common Law Nor the Terms of the Lease Agreement
Impose Any Duty Whatsoever on SLW to Repair or Replace the Roof.

Consistent with the parties' agreement that the Griffithses would pay to SLW "a
fixed guaranteed lease," Purchase Agreement, ,,
Ajzreomr

.-

-.;.-. ,=

- requirement that SLW repair or replace anything in, on, or

around the Orange Street Building. Where, as here, there is no contractual obligation on
the part of a lessor to repair or replace a roof, the common l.r.v w ill jmi impose sin h ,i
dut) , Oven if lli ,: Griffithses had not committed unqualifiedly, as they did, to maintain
the roof and to keep and put the roof in sound condition (i.e., "in repair"), there would
7

be no duty to repair or replace on the part of SLW. Where lease agreements are silent
as to any duty by anyone to repair or replace, and where there is no new governmental
requirement, outside the contemplation of the parties, compelling a repair or replacement,
the courts have found that no one has a duty to repair or replace.
Here, however, that is not the situation, because (1) the Griffithses certainly
contemplated that the 20-year roof, which was thirteen years old at the time their lease
commenced, would require replacement during the 15-year lease term; and (2) the
Griffithses explicitly agreed to maintain the roof, keep the roof in repair, and put the roof
in repair, where necessary. Replacement of the roof being necessary in order to maintain
the roof, and to keep or put the roof in repair, the obligation for its replacement was
solely that of the Griffithses.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CONSIDER PAROL EVIDENCE IN
MAKING ITS DETERMINATION: IN FACT. IT EXPRESSLY RULED
THAT THE LEASE AGREEMENT IS AN INTEGRATED CONTRACT AND
THAT ARTICLE 4 OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT IS UNAMBIGUOUS.
Without any basis whatsoever, the Griffithses have argued at length that the trial

court "impermissibly considered parol evidence offered by SLW," Appellants' Brief, at
10, and that "[t]he admission of the extrinsic evidence necessarily changed the
interpretation of the lease." Id.

8

The parol evidence about which the Griffithses complain concerned whether the

court of anything remotely relating to parol evidence was the court's reference during the
hearing on the motions for summary judgment to the arguments of the parties. The

The plaintiff contends that it is not liable because this is a net lease
and that, as such, the landlord will only receive a fixed rent without any
other charges.
Partial Iraiiscri.ptctfHeai ing, Api il 18, 199 ; "' {' ""!; ai tial • I ' " ), a t 2 [R it 215)
The trial court did not indicate in any way that it was considering any parol
evidence with respect to the "net lease" issue, or with respect to anything else In fact.
by her comments immediately following the reference

^

.^, .JI^J I S ^ C . u ^ e

Stirba made it clear that reference to extrinsic evidence was unnecessary and that she was
limiting her analysis to the four corners of the Lease Agreement. Judge Stirba stated:
The outcome of these motions depends on whether the phrase ' 'tenant shall
maintain and keep in repair and shall put into repair, where necessary, a
wall and roof of the building of which the premises are a part," and so on.
Whether that is clear and not ambiguous, each party says that : "
clear and unambiguous as each party respectively interprets that particular
phrase. Looking at this contract, it appears to me that it's an integrated
contract . . . .

9

I agree with both parties that there are no material facts in dispute
and find as a matter of law tint the phrase is clear and unambiguous.
Partial Tr., at 2 (R. at 215).5
Likewise, in it vvritten order, the trial court made clear that it did not consider any
parol evidence in arriving at its decision but, rather, found the Lease Agreement to be
an integrated contract with unambiguous provisions relating to the Griffithses' duty to
maintain the roof, and to keep and put it into repair. Order, at 1 (R. at 215).
II.

THE GRIFFITHSES' UNQUALIFIED COVENANT TO "MAINTAIN AND
KEEP IN REPAIR (AND . . . PUT INTO REPAIR WHERE NECESSARY)
THE . . . ROOF OF THE BUILDING" OBLIGATES THEM TO MEET
THAT DUTY, EVEN IF REPLACEMENT OF THE ROOF IS REQUIRED
TO MAINTAIN THE ROOF, OR TO KEEP OR PUT THE ROOF IN
REPAIR.
The Griffithses argue at great length that the verb, "to repair," does not mean

"replace,"6 "rebuild," or "reconstruct." Appellants' Brief, at 16-26. However, they
5

The quotation here is taken directly from the prepared transcript of the hearing on
the parties' motions for summary judgment. It seems, however, that with some minor
punctuation changes, and word corrections, the statement and meaning of the trial court
in the first two sentences quoted above would be more accurately and coherently
portrayed as follows:
The outcome of these motions depends on whether the phrase "tenant shall
maintain and keep in repair (and shall put into repair where necessary) the
walls and roof of the building of which the premises are a part," and so on
— whether that is clear and not ambiguous. Each party says that it's clear
and unambiguous as each party respectively interprets that particular phrase.
6

Even if the word "repair" were used in the Lease Agreement in the same sense as
(continued...)
10

have entirely missed the mark, inasmuch as the Lease Agreement entered into between
i;*;; ^riinthses and SL W does not provide that the Griffithses
wil 1 " ~i^'nt:> "

**

' -p~.r. '

^i~ i;iey

J where necessary, "put into repair" the roof.

Applying the plain, common meaning of the terminology actually used in the Lease
Agreement, the conclusion is inescapable that the Griffithses assumed the duty , without

in good, sound, usable condition.
A

The plain. Ordinary Meanings of the Words and Phrases Used in
Paragraph 4.1 of the Lease Agreement Make it Clear That the
Griffithses are Required to Maintain the Roof, and to Keep and Put the
Roof in Sound Condition, Even if Replacement of the Roof is Required,

In their Brief, the Griffithses state as follows:
W hen interpreting contracts, " 'the ordinary and usual meaning 01 aie
words used is given effect." Warburton v. Va. Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan,
899 P.2d 779, 782 (Utah App. 1995), citing Berman v. Berman, 749 P.2d
1271 (Utah 1988). The "ordinary and usual" meaning is often best derived
from standard, non-legal dictionaries. Id., citing Government Employees
Ins. Co. v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1982).
Appellant .s" Bi ie I:' ;i tl I ; I 8
...continued)
that addressed by the Griffithses in their Brief, it would commonly include "replacement."
See, e.g., Triple M Roofing Corp. v. Tremcot Inc., 753 F.2d 242, 244 (2d Cir. 1985)
("Defective roofs are generally repaired by removing and replacing the entire roof."
(emphasis added)); Altaian, New Face Off Over School Bond, Post and Courier
(Charleston, S.C.), Feb. 15, 1998, at Al ("I remember complaining when they were
doing these magnet schools that there were 34 roofs that needed repair, from
replacements to minor repair." (emphasis added)).
11

With those statements SLW wholeheartedly agrees. By the application of those
rules of contract interpretation, the duty to replace the roof falls squarely on the
Griffithses.
1.

By Agreeing to "Maintain" the Roof, tib Griffithses Obligated Themselves to
Replace It if Replacement Were Necessary to Keep or Put the Roof in Sound
Condition,
The Griffithses' promise to "maintain" the roof is enough, by itself to impose

upon them a duty to replace the roof if replacement is required to keep the roof in good,
sound condition. As commonly used, the word "maintain" is defined as follows:
to keep in a certain condition or position, especially of efficiency, good
repair, etc.; to preserve; as the state maintains the roads.
WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1087 (2d ed. 1983); see also

1105 (4th rev. ed.) ("[I]t is variously defined as acts of repair

and other acts to prevent a decline, lapse or cessation from existing state or condition;
. . . keep in good order; keep in proper condition; keep in repair; keep up; . . . rebuild;
repair; replace . . . . " ) .
The state could not truly be said to "maintain" the roads when, after a road is
washed out by a flood, the state refused to rebuild or replace it.7 Neither can the
Griffithses credibly assert that, while the roof is leaking, they would be "maintaining" it
7

The duty to "maintain" a highway was recently held by a British appellate court to
include a duty to construct a proper drainage system. Duty to maintain highway not
absolute, The Times (London), July 10, 1997, at 42.
12

by refusing to replace the roof if replacement were required in order to put it in good
condition.
... , .jdman v. Lei V bir, 241 P 2d 1 1 9 0 u: iz 1952), the lease agreement at issue
provided that the lessees i * 'ere to "maintain and keep in good repair (not including major
structural alterations) the entire premises." 241 P.2d at 781. Noting that "[t]he lessees
were not only to 'repair' the premises but they were, in addition thereto, required to
<

rpci'",,air *

* j " *->"

*

x1

''"^.

\irr ^"^jr -**-•.'* ^^ts.iri

to "maintain" the premises, had a duty to replace a gas line pipe with a larger, different
type of pipe in order to bring it into conformity with a municipal ordinance. 11

and had to be replaced," the Florida District Court of Appeal held that the lessee, who
had agreed to "maintain the interior and exterior" of the leased premises was responsible
1 u i 111 c l e p 1 a L c J 11 e 11L n I 1111 11 > 111. S t >a i /1t11, \ i I. .

* /. ^ ginbotham C 'h eI v o le

Oldsmobile, Inc., 445 So. 2d 347, 348 (Fla. Dist. ^ . ^ F F . xJS4). 8
The decision of the court in Southeast Banks Trust Co. comports with the common
meaning

J.

...;,

-•-
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*
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.^aWliaiiita"

In Southeast Banks Trust Co., the lessor had agreed to "keep structural elements of
the building in good and substantial repair." 445 So. 2d at 348. The court found that
a "structural element" is a "part of a building which supports it," - -•* ' w 'he roo r •• ;r
excluded from, that definition. Id. at 349.
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a roof by allowing it to leak and cave in, while offerir i the excuse that the roof could not
be put in good condition other than by replacement.
By finally having work done on the roof to stop the leaking, the Griffithses simply
fulfilled their duty to "maintain" the roof, which they were obligated to do by the express
terms of the Lease Agreement.
2,

Bv Agreeing to Keep the Roof in Repair, and. Where Necessary, to Put the
Roof Into Repair, the Griffithses Obligated Themselves to Replace the Roof
if Replacement Were Necessary to Keep or Put the Roof in Sound Condition.
A fatal error made by the Griffithses is found in that portion of their Brief

immediately following their statements regarding contract interpretation. There, dealing
with the word "repair" in a completely different sense than used in the Lease Agreement,
the Griffithses state as follows:
Because the "ordinary and usual" meaning of "repair" does not mean to
"replace," "reconstruct," or "rebuild," the trial court's interpretation to the
contrary should be reversed.
Appellants' Brief, at 18.
The Griffithses' argument concerning the word "repair" is, irrelevantly, in the
context of the word used as the verb "to repair," or as the noun, "a repair." The
Griffithse. ignore the actual language of the Lease Agreement, which is dispositive of the
issue here. The parties agreed not that the Griffithses would "repair the roof," nor that
they would make "a repair" to the roof; rather, they agreed, unambiguously, that the
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Griffith ses w< *] '

.

w ^ •.

repair."
That usage of the phrase "in repair" commits the Griffithses to do whatever is
icquned I i ' i i |
qualification.

pul illin i

I nil «jnud, 'niiiid, usable tciidiiinii, without any

"In repair" refers to a state or a condition; it does not in any manner

restrict the means utilized to "keep" or "put" something in that state or condition.
' I lie dictionaries

. define the

\

repair" :; -he context of the phrase *^

repair" all compel a determination that the Griffithses' r-^nmifrip'
the roof "in repair" gives rise to a duty to take whatever steps are required to "keep" or
>.., v.,..
ordinrr*

^ in a good, sound, usable condition, ilk, knowing are illustrative of the
-r ^ i definition s of "i epai i*"

I ease Agreement:

condition with respect to soundness and usability: a house in good (or bad)
repair.
WEBSTER'S

D i m II>.I

i AivihRiLAN h N o i h i i hJo i I i a! p w / i .

The state of being repaired, or in good or sound condition; as, the house is
in repair or out of repair; also, condition with respect to soundness or need
of repairing; as, in good, bad, or excellent repair.
WhBSl'LF' 1 ' Nl/W iNIIRM^lluNAL IJRIIUNAI'

•' H i t LNULlSll LANUUAGL 1\

a condition or state • in good repair.
CUAMlihKS 2 l M CLNIlW'i Ull IIUNAia I 18J (I'.U'd
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I'^fil

I

in (a) good/bad (state of) repair in good/bad condition
LONGMAN DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH

881 (2d ed. 1987).

in repair, in good or proper condition (esp. of structures; so into repair),
out of repair, in bad condition, requiring repairs.
THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY

627 (2d ed. 1989).

The use of the phrase "in repair" to describe a state or condition — rather than the
means used (e.g., repair, replacement, reconstruction) to obtain that state or condition —
is common; in fact, it is the only accepted use of the phrase.
GULLIVER'S TRAVELS,

For instance, in

Jonathan Swift described the homes in Lagado as follows:

The next morning after my arrival he took me in his chariot to see
the town, which is about half the bigness of London, but the houses very
strangely built, and most of them out of repair.
Jonathan Swift,

GULLIVER'S TRAVELS

142 (Lewis A. Landa ed., Houghton Mifflin Co.

1960) (emphasis added); see also MARK

TWAIN'S NOTEBOOK

345 (2d ed. 1935) ("It is

not best that we use our morals week days; it gets them out of repairs for Sundays."
(emphasis added)).
Likewise, the common usage by the courts of the phrase "in repair" refers to a
state or condition — even where replacement of a roof is required in order to "put it in
repair."
The water was over four feet deep in it, and debris from the Yuba was
deposited in it to a considerable depth. The underpinning of the center of
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the building was washed out, and the rooffell in. It cost between $2,000
and $3,000 to put it in repair again
Wood? ujj

i i * 'orth Bioomfield Gravel

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1931) (holding that duty to "put in repair" entailed "replacing" steel
deck).
J g n o j i u g tin i H ' d i i i a i y l i n a g e \\\ iln |iln m i

ill irj'iiiir,

i u i ill i n illm

I n i

Agreement, the Griffithses rely on cases involving an entirely different usage of the word
"repair," or on cases involving "general covenants" or situations in which the repair or

their lease agreement.
For instance, the Griffithses seek to find support in Mobil Oil Credit Corp. v. DST
Realty, ,

..

-

.

, \\: p.

. - ._s" Bi ief, at 13 21 , I hat

case is wholly inapposite for several reasons. First, and perhaps most importantly, the
lease under consideration in Mobil Oil, unlike the Lease Agreement entered into between
.,,. Urriffithses ana ., .

provides that "lessee agrees to

premises

' 'emphasis added). That commitment was far different from

""'

*

. up:,::

that of the Griffithses; the lessee i 'Aobil Oil agreed to make "all repairs," not to "keep
in r°*-

• „ . .to r *rs]:

he re*^, ^ause at Issue »n :>io;;u . was a

vtwv Mfi' i in ni linn inn idiui null irrike specific I'rfnnit i In ihr ,irea nl lln1 premises r * * < 11 I i f I r n*
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structural repairs. Further, the amount required to complete the structural repairs in
Mobil Oil was far more than the yearly rental amount; here, the cost of repairing the roof
was less than half the annual rental amount.9 Finally, the court in Mobil Oil found that
the repairs were so unforeseen and so substantial that it would be unreasonable to require
the tenant to make them. Id. at 661. In the instant case, of course, the need for a new
roof during the term of the lease was not only foreseeable — it was a virtual certainty,
and the Griffithses knew it.
Next, the Griffithses rely on Sandelman v. Buckeye Realty, Inc., 576 N.E.2d 1038
(111. App. Ct. 1991). Appellants' Brief, at 18, 22-23. That case, however, is also
inapposite to the issues presented by this appeal. First of all, although the lease at issue
in Sandelman provided that the tenant was to "keep said premises . . . in good repair/
id. at 1039 (emphasis added), the court resorted to dictionary definitions of the word
"repair" as if the word were used in an entirely different manner than actually used in the
lease agreement. Id. at 1040. Also, of critical importance, the court in Sandelman
"note[d] the absence of any express language pertaining to the roof." Id. In fact, the

9

In Washington Univ. v. Royal Crown Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 801 S.W.2d 458,
465-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990), the court held that "the usual and ordinary meaning of
repair does not exclude a repair that is structural in nature," and distinguished Mobil Oil
on the bases that (1) Mobil Oil did not involve a long-term lease, (2) the lease in Mobil
Oil "provided for certain repairs to be made by the landlord," id. at 466, and (3) "[t]he
structural repair at issue was to correct an unforeseeable latent structural defect which
existed prior to the lease." Id.
18

decision in Sandelman hinged on the principle — inapplicable where, as here, a covenant
deals specifically with a roof — that a lessee's "general covenant," relating to the
premises as a whole, does not require the lessee to make repairs involving "structural
changes,"10 or to make "renewals and replacements which would last a lifetime." Id.
Sandelman can have no application to the instant matter, where the subject Lease
Agreement does not contain a general covenant, but, rather, a specific requirement that
the lessee "maintain" the roof, keep the roof "in repair," and, where necessary, put the
roof "into repair."
For the same and for additional reasons, Scott v. Prazma, 555 P.2d 571 (Wyo.
1976), is of no help to the Griffithses. As in Sandelman, the lease at issue in Scott
required the lessee to keep the leased premises "in good repair," yet the court relied on
the definition for the word "repair" as a verb (i.e., to repair). Id. at 577. Of perhaps
even greater importance, the extensive repairs at issue in Scott were required by the
municipality in which the leased premises were located, to bring them into compliance
with the building code and safety regulations. Id. at 572-75. Those requirements were

20

Contrary to the decision in Sandelman, the court in Washington Univ. held that a
lessee who has undertaken to "make all repairs necessary to keep the leased premises in
good repair" has a duty to make all necessary "structural repairs." 801 S.W.2d at 465.
According to the court, "the usual and ordinary meaning of repair does not exclude a
repair that is structural in nature." Id. at 465. In Washington Univ., the court also
required the lessee to replace the roofs on four buildings. Id. at 467.
19

found by the court to have been outside the contemplation of the parties at the time they
entered into their lease agreement; in fact, the court said that to require, under a general
covenant, the repairs at issue would be "shockingly unforeseen." Id. at 577. Just the
opposite is true with regard to the Orange Street building roof, which had seven years of
expected remaining life at the beginning of the Griffithses' 15-year lease.
The Griffithses also find no support in Expert Corp. v. La Salle Nat'I Bank, 496
N.E.2d 3 (111. App. Ct. 1986). Expert also involved a general repair clause, without any
reference in the lease agreement to the specific area of the premises requiring repair or
replacement. Id. at 4. Also, the decision in Expert would have been just the opposite
had the court found the alterations or additions were not "unforeseen future events not
within the contemplation of the parties at the time the lease was executed." Id. at 5.
The Griffithses cite to Quebe v. Davis, 586 N.E.2d 914 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992),
Appellants' Brief, at 18, 21-22; however, a close reading of that case causes one to
wonder why. In Quebe, the lessor was required to replace the roof of the leased
premises because of his commitment in the lease agreement to "repair and restore" the
premises if they are damaged by "fire or other cause." Id. at 918.
Finally, the Griffithses cite to Realty & Rebuilding Co. v. REA, 194 P. 1024 (Cal.
1920). Appellants' Brief, at 18, 23. However, Realty & Rebuilding stands for nothing
more than the proposition, irrelevant here, that a general covenant by a lessee to repair

20

premises does not create a duty to rebuild the premises after they are destroyed by
fire.11
Although the Griffithses have cited to the above-described inapposite cases from
several other jurisdictions, one need look no further than to the controlling precedent,
Wolfe v. White, 225 P.2d 729 (Utah 1950), which is nowhere mentioned in the
Griffithses' Brief.

11

As the court in Realty & Rebuilding recognized, the decisions are not at all uniform
regarding whether a general covenant to repair imposes an obligation to rebuild structures
that have been completely destroyed. Realty & Rebuilding, 194 P. at 1028. In fact,
many cases have affirmed the long-standing common law rule that a general repair clause
does indeed create a duty to rebuild a structure that has been completely destroyed by fire
or other cause. See, e.g., Pivnick v. Seaboard Supply Co., 105 A.2d 695, 698 (N.J.
Super. 1954) (At common law "the tenant's covenant to make repairs, or to return the
premises in the same condition as upon the demise, obliged him to repair fire damage,
and to rebuild in case of total destruction."); Arnold-Evans Co. v. Hardung, 232 P. 290,
291 (Wash. 1925) ("[I]f the tenant enters into an express and unconditional covenant to
repair and keep in repair, or to surrender the premises in good repair, he is liable for the
destruction of buildings not rebuilt by him, though the destruction may have occurred by
fire or other accident, or by the act of enemies, without fault on his part."); Armstrong
v. Maybee, 48 P. 737, 738 (Wash. 1897) ("'[A] covenant "to repair, uphold, and
support," or to "well and sufficiently repair," or to keep in repair and leave as found, or
to "repair and keep in repair," to keep in "good repair, natural wear and tear excepted,"
to make "all necessary repairs," to deliver up "in tenantable repair," or to "deliver up the
premises in as good a condition as they now are," all impose upon the covenantor the
duty of rebuilding or restoring premises destroyed or injured by the elements.'" (quoting
Wood, Landlord & Tenant § 370 (2d ed.))); Jones v. Two Rivers Ford, Inc., 301 S.E.2d
192, 195 (W. Va. 1983) ("'At common law where a covenant to repair was contained in
the lease and the building was destroyed by some fire or casualty, the lessee was
responsible for repairs thereto, whether he was at fault or not.'").
21

In Wolfe, the same question was posed as now faces this Court: If a party to a
lease agreement commits to "keep the roof of the leased premises in good condition and
repair," who is liable for the replacement of the roof if replacement is necessary to keep
the roof in good condition and repair? The Utah Supreme Court posed the issue very
simply: "It [the roof] was out of good condition and repair. Who was to put it in?" 225
P.2d at 731. Of course, the answer was that the party who committed in a lease
agreement to keep the roof in repair was obligated to put the roof in good condition and
repair — even if replacement of the roof was required in order to achieve that condition.
Id. at 731-32. According to the Court, a provision in a lease agreement requiring the
lessor "to keep the roof of the leased premises in good condition and repair" created a
"duty of the lessor to see that a roof in good condition and repair was available . . . at
all times . . . ." Id. at 732.
The rule stated by the Court in Wolfe is the same as that adopted by DaytonHudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 751 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1984), in which the
court held that if a party has agreed to "repair and maintain in good order and condition"
a roof, and if the roof "could not be maintained in good order and condition by repairs
other than by replacement of the roof," 751 F.2d at 220, then the party obligated to
"repair and maintain in good order and condition" must replace the roof. Id.
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In Yakima Valley Motors v. Webb Tractor & Equipment Co., 128 P. 507 (Wash.
1942), the lessee had promised in a lease agreement to "make such repairs to both the
exterior and interior of [the leased] building, including the roof thereof, . . . in as good
condition as the same now is, and in as good condition as the same may be placed and
after the completion of said changes, alterations and repairs to be made thereto by the
lessee as herein contemplated." Because the roof was "in such bad state that it could not
have been repaired at a cost less than that of a new roof," 128 P. at 509, the court ruled
the lessee was responsible for the replacement. The court noted that "[w]here a lessee
covenants to put and keep a building in repair, he is bound to keep it 'wind and water
tight.'" Id. at 509 (quoting 32 Am. Jur. § 780); see also Oregonian Ry. Co. v. Oregon
Ry. & Nav. Co., 37 F. 733, 734 (D. Or. 1885) (holding that where a party covenanted
in a lease agreement to maintain and operate a road, and keep it in good repair, it was
obligated to replace two bridges carried away by floods).
B.

The Surrender Clause in the Lease Agreement Does Not Restrict or
Modify the Obligation of the Griffithses to Assure. By Whatever Means
Required. That the Roof Will, at All Times, Be in Sound Condition,

The Griffithses argue that paragraph 4.1 of the Lease Agreement, which requires
the Griffithses to "maintain and keep in repair (and . . . put in repair where necessary)
the walls and roof of the building," is somehow modified and restricted by paragraph 4.2,
which requires the Griffithses to surrender the leased premises "in as good condition as

23

it was at the beginning of the term, reasonable wear excepted." Appellants' Brief, at 2632.

The Griffithses maintain that their unqualified obligations in paragraph 4.1 to

maintain the roof, keep the roof in repair, and, where necessary, put the roof into repair,
are oblitera ed by an exception, found in the surrender clause (paragraph 4.2), for
"reasonable wear."12
To adopt the reasoning of the Griffithses would entirely eliminate paragraph 4.1
of the Lease Agreement, in violation of the principle that contracts are to be interpreted
in a manner that harmonizes all provisions and gives effect to every provision. See, e.g.,
Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah 1992). First, the Griffithses cite to the
Restatement (Second) of Property for the following proposition:
A promise by the tenant to keep the leased premises in repair, unless the
language of the promise clearly provides otherwise, does not obligate the
tenant to make repairs other than those that are the result of ordinary wear
and tear on the leased property.
12

Instead of citing to current case law on this issue, the Griffithses are content to rely
on six extremely outdated cases, the most recent of which is a 1954 decision of the Idaho
Supreme Court. Appellants' Brief, at 27-28. In fact, two of the cases relied on by the
Griffithses are so old they do not even bear a date in their citations; two others were
decided in 1901 and 1917, respectively.
The reasoning in those cases flies in the face of the current controlling principles
of contract interpretation. Instead of giving effect to each provision in the contract, the
cases on which the Griffithses rely give effect only to the surrender clauses in lease
agreements, rendering meaningless the repair and maintenance clauses. See, e.g., Corbett
v. Derman Shoe Co., 155 N.E.2d 423, 427 (Mass. 1959), which notes that one of the
cases upon which the Griffithses rely, Ball v. Wyeth, 8 Allen, Mass. 275, "makes the
redelivery covenant alone significant."
24

Appellants' Brief, at 20 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Property § 13.1 cmt. c (1977)
(emphasis added)).
Then, the Griffithses seek to remove even repairs necessitated by ordinary wear
and tear from the coverage of paragraph 4.1 by arguing that the exception for "reasonable
wear" in paragraph 4.2 should be engrafted on paragraph 4.1. Hence, if the Griffithses'
theory of contract construction were accepted, paragraph 4.1 of the Lease Agreement
would magically disappear, leaving no obligation whatsoever for the Griffithses to
maintain the roof, keep the roof in repair, or put the roof into repair, as they expressly
agreed to do. As the court in Avelez Hotel Corp. v. Milner Hotels, Inc., 87 So. 2d 63,
66 (Miss. 1956), noted: "If defendant's theory were to be regarded as correct, why did
the lease contain this covenant as to necessary repairs at all?"13
The more recent cases have recognized that an exception for "wear and tear" in
a surrender clause does not restrict the obligations under an unqualified promise to
maintain or keep in repair. For instance, in Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. Ruben, 493
13

In Avelez, the court considered the effect of a surrender clause on the timing of an
action for breach of a repairs covenant. The court noted as follows:
A distinction is made between a covenant to repair and a covenant to
surrender in repair. The former differs from the latter in that it is more
extensive in its application. A covenant to make repairs from time to time
is not satisfied by making repairs at any time before the premises are
surrendered. Repairs must be made when needed.
87 So. 2d at 65.
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S.W.2d 74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973), the lease under consideration, similar to the Lease
Agreement at issue in the instant case, provided, in part, as follows:
[1]

All repairs deemed necessary by Lessee during the term of this
lease, and the expense of maintaining both the exterior and the
interior . . . of said demised premises . . . shall be at the cost and
expense of the Lessee . . . .
*

[3]

*

*

The Lessee and all holding under said Lessee agree to . . . keep the same
in good order and repair, and to surrender the said premises at the
termination of this lease in as good condition as received, ordinary wear
and tear and depreciation excepted.

493 S.W.2dat75.
In Garland, the tenant sought to modify its broad obligation under the first
paragraph by imposing the exception in the third paragraph upon it. The court refused
to disregard the repair clause, as the tenant sought, commenting as follows:
Garland [tenant] seeks relief from the broad liability of sentence [1]
by relying on sentence [3]. Therein Garland was obligated to keep the
building in good order and repair and to surrender it in as good condition
as when received, ordinary wear and tear and depreciation excepted. There
is no need to credit Garland's argument that repairing the facing is within
the last quoted phrase. First, we are not concerned with liability existing
at surrender time . . . . Second, reading the whole paragraph it is clear
sentence [3] in no way limits Garland's continuing obligation under sentence
[1] to maintain the exterior of the building.
Id.
Likewise, in another case involving repair and termination clauses similar to those
in the Lease Agreement entered into between the Griffithses and SLW, the court held
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"that the covenant to keep the premises in good repair is not subject to and is independent
of the surrender covenant which excepts ordinary wear and tear." McKinnery v. White
Sewing Machine Corp., 200 N.E.2d 596, 601 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964).
Clearly, because each provision of a contract is to be given effect, with none of
them ignored, Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981),
paragraph 4.1 of the parties' Lease Agreement must be read as requiring the Griffithses
to take whatever steps are necessary to keep or put the roof in a sound condition. To
except from that duty those repairs necessitated by "reasonable wear" would completely
eviscerate the Griffithses' obligations, rendering paragraph 4.1 virtually of no effect. The
clear language of paragraph 4.1 must control; the Griffithses have a duty during the term
of the lease to maintain the roof, and to keep, and put, it in a good, sound, usable
condition.
C.

To Hold the Griffithses to Their Agreement Would Be Equitable: To
Allow Them to Avoid Their Obligations Would be Wholly Inequitable,

Having agreed they would pay to SLW "a fixed guaranteed lease" (R. at 163), and
having agreed they would maintain the roof, keep the roof in repair, and, where
necessary, put the roof into repair, the Griffithses seek to avoid their unambiguous
promises by arguing that to hold them to their commitment would be "inequitable."
Appellants' Brief at 32-37.
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The only inequity that could result here would be for the Griffithses to be allowed
to dodge their duty to keep and put the roof in sound condition. They sold the building,
then leased it back. At the time of the lease, the roof, which had a 20-year life
expectancy, was 13 years old. The Griffithses knew, or certainly should have known,
that the roof would require replacement approximately 7 years into their 15-year lease.
If they did not intend to undertake the obligation to keep and put the roof in sound
condition, they could have tried to negotiate a lease agreement that placed the duty to
maintain the roof and keep it in repair on SLW. That is not, however, what the Lease
Agreement provides. It is now too late for the Griffithses to complain that they do not
think the deal they struck was an "equitable" one.
In Robinson v. Wilson, 173 P. 331 (Wash. 1918), the tenant argued that the
landlord should be responsible for certain defects in the leased building, including the
seeping of water. Noting that the only obligation of the landlord was to construct the
building according to "plans and specifications," and that the tenant had not proven the
building was not so constructed, the court addressed the "fairness" question as follows:
The trouble in this case is that we are asked to make a contract
grounded in the equities incident to subsequent events, where the parties
who might have foreseen every incident and circumstances now relied on
failed to guard against them in their written contract.
*

*

*

It may at times result in inequity, but the law is so written that a
landlord is not bound beyond the terms of his lease, and that parties who
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enter written contracts are presumed to have in contemplation probable
consequence and the established principles of the law.
Written contracts would be of little consequence in the business
world if they were to be so overcome, or if, working to the disadvantage
of one who has agreed to pay a certain price, his express contract could be
turned, over the protest of his adversary, into a quantum valebat.
173 P. at 333.
That principle has been repeated several times by the Utah Supreme Court, as
follows:
Generally speaking, neither of the parties, nor the court has any right to
ignore or modify conditions which are clearly expressed merely because it
may subject one of the parties to hardship, but they must be enforced "in
accordance with the intention as * * * manifested by the language used by
the parties in the contract."
Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk, 321 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1958) (quoting Murphy v.
Salt Lake City, 65 Utah 295, 236 P. 680, 683 (Utah 1925)); see also Jones v. ACME
Building Products, Inc., 450 P.2d 743, 746 (Utah 1969).
The uncontroverted record is that the Griffithses initially had ten years use of a 20year roof; at the end of the lease term, they will have had five years use of a roof that
has only a 10-year manufacturer's warranty. Clark Aff., at 3, 1f 10 (R. at 59).14 Also,
14

Carl Clark stated in his affidavit that the roof installed by Clark's Quality Roofing
has a "rated maximum life expectancy of 20 years" (emphasis added), but that there is
only "a 10-year manufacturer's warranty on materials and a 5-year warranty on labor."
Clark Aff., at 3, 1 10 (R. at 59).
(continued...)
29

the amount paid by the Griffithses is less than one-half the amount of their annual lease
obligation and less than 3% of the total lease payments to be made during the lease term.
This case poses a far different situation than the cases relied upon by the Griffithses, Scott
and Mobil Oil, for their argument that it would be unfair to hold them to their agreement.
Appellants' Brief at 33-36. Scott and Mobil Oil are wholly inapposite. As noted at pages
17 through 19, supra, the courts in Scott and Mobil Oil both found that the repairs
involved in those cases were unforeseeable at the time the lease agreements were entered
into. Also, in both cases, general covenants of repair were at issue, with no mention of
the specific areas requiring repairs. Finally, the repairs at issue in both of those cases
were enormously expensive in relation to the annual lease payments. In Scott, the rental
amount was $700 per month, 555 P.2d at 573, and the cost of repairs was estimated at

14

(... continued)
Kraig S. Clawson stated in his affidavit that "the single ply membrane roof . . .
installed on the [Orange Street Building] has a normal life expectancy of approximately
10 years." Affidavit of Kraig S. Clawson, at 2, f3 (R. at 87) (emphasis added).
Those affidavits are not inconsistent, inasmuch as Mr. Clark spoke of a
"maximum" life expectancy, while Mr. Clawson spoke of a "normal" life expectancy.
However, even if there were some factual dispute as to the life expectancy of the roof
installed by Clark's Quality Roofing, it is not a material issue inasmuch as (1) any
difference in life expectancy of the roof would not affect the analysis of the "equities";
and (2) regardless of the life expectancy of the roof, the new roof was required in order
for the Griffithses to comply with their duty to maintain the roof, and to keep it, and put
it into, sound condition.
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$60,000, id. at 575; in Mobil Oil, the rental amount was $350,000 per year and the total
cost of repairs was $438,207.66. 689 S.W.2d at 659.
The agreement of the Griffithses with respect to the maintenance and condition of
the roof was entirely fair and unambiguously stated in the Lease Agreement. The
agreement of the parties having been negotiated and reduced to writing, it would be
entirely inequitable for this Court to rewrite the contract and permit the Griffithses to
avoid their duty.
III.

SLW HAS NO DUTY, AT COMMON LAW OR UNDER THE TERMS OF
THE LEASE AGREEMENT. TO REPAIR OR REPLACE THE ROOF
DURING THE GRIFFITHSES' TENANCY,
The Griffithses argue that they do not have a duty to keep or put the roof in sound

condition, notwithstanding their unambiguous agreement to do so. But nowhere do the
Griffithses argue that SLW has any such duty.15 The absence of such an agreement is for

15

The Griffithses, understandably, appear to have abandoned their argument that
paragraph 17.5 of the Lease Agreement imposes some sort of duty on SLW to make
"replacements." See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, at 7 (R. at 36). Paragraph 17.5 provides for the abatement of rent
in the event the leased premises are rendered unfit for more than ten days by the making
of repairs, replacements or additions without the Griffithses' consent and not caused by
the misuse or neglect of the Griffithses. Lease Agreement, at 8, if 17.5 (R. at 55). Such
a provision, which contemplates the possibility of repairs, replacements or additions,
however, does not translate into a legal duty to repair, replace or add anything to the
leased premises. See, e.g., Cherberg v. Peoples Nat'l Bank of Wash., 549 P.2d 46, 51
(Wash. Ct. App. 1976) ("[LJessor has expressly reserved the right to repair the portions
of the building not forming a part of the demised premises. Such a reserved right is far
removed from an express undertaking to perform repair.").
31

for good reason; nothing in the common law, nor in the Lease Agreement, imposes upon
SLW any duty whatsoever to repair or replace the roof.
The agreement of the parties was that the Griffithses would pay to SLW "a fixed
guaranteed lease." Purchase Agreement, at 16 (R. at 163). SLW did not undertake, in
the Lease Agreement or elsewhere, to repair, replace, or renovate anything.
Inasmuch as SLW did not undertake to make any repairs, replacements or
renovations in the Lease Agreement, they have no such duty because, absent an
agreement, a lessor has no duty to repair, replace or renovate anything. The common
law rule was described by the Utah Supreme Court as follows:
[Ajbsent deceit or fraud on the part of the landlord or an express warranty
to the contrary, the landlord [has] no duty to make repairs during the course
of the tenancy.
Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Utah 1991) (citing Jespersen v. Deseret News
Publishing Co., 119 Utah 235, 225 P.2d 1050, 1053 (1951)).16
l6

See also Vie Caldor Corp. v. Newburgh Mall Ltd. Partnership, 204 BR. 855, 858
(Bankr\ S.D.N.Y. 1997) ('f[I]n the absence of a covenant to the contrary, the lessor is
under no obligation to repair the demised premises."); Egan v. Brewer, 9 Haw. 18, 21
(1893) ('\A landlord is under no obligation to make repairs, unless such a stipulation
makes a part of the original contract.'" (quoting Gill v. Middleton, 105 Mass. 477));
Daley v. Towne, 149 N.W 368, 369 (Minn. 1914) ("It is well stated that in the absence
of any covenant or agreement in the lease to repair, and where there is no fraud,
misrepresentation, or concealment by the lessor, there is no implied warranty on his part
that the leased premises are fit for the purposes for which they are rented, or covenant
to put them in repair or to keep them so."); Schmidt v. Constans, 85 N.W. 173 (Minn.
1901); Miller v. Miller, 64 So. 2d 739, 743 (Miss. 1953) ("[I]t is well settled that the
(continued...)
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That common law rule is not altered even if a lessee may have no duty to repair
or replace. For instance, in Western Motors Servicing Corp. v. LandDev. & Inv. Co.,
313 P.2d 927, 929 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957), the court held that the absence of a duty on the
part of the tenant to replace "does not mean that the landlord is under a duty to replace."
313 P.2d at 929; see also City of St. Petersburg v. Competition Sails, Inc., 449 So. 2d
852 (Fla. 1984) (holding that a lessor's duty to repair cannot be assumed simply because
the lessee is not obligated to make repairs). A corollary to that rule is the principle that
"in the absence of an agreement between the parties, there is no obligation on the part of
the lessor to pay the lessee for improvements erected by the lessee upon the demised
premises, even though the improvements are such that by reason of their annexation to

16

(... continued)
landlord is under no obligation to rebuild or restore premises destroyed without his fault
if he had not covenanted to do so."); Refrigeration for Science, Inc. v. Deacon Realty
Corp., 334 N.Y.S.2d 418, 425 (1972) ("Without an express undertaking to repair the
demised premises, the lessor is neither bound to do so himself nor to pay for repairs
made by the tenant."); Edwards v. Ollen Restaurant Corp., 98 N. Y.S.2d 815 (1950) ("In
the absence of a covenant to the contrary, the lessor is under no obligation to repair the
demised premises . . . . Nor will covenants to repair be implied."); Evco Corp. v. Ross,
528 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Tenn. 1975) ("[Ojrdinarily, as between the landlord and tenant, the
lessor has no obligation to make repairs upon leased premises. His obligation to do so,
in general, rests upon contract."); Seone v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 457 S.E.2d 93, 96
(Va. 1995) ("In the absence of an express agreement, the landlord had no common-law
or statutory duty to maintain, repair, or replace either the roof or the heating and air
conditioning units."); Friedman on Leases § 10.101 (1997) ("The landlord is under no
obligation either to put them [leased premises] in repair or to keep them in repair during
the term of the lease.").
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the freehold they may have become a part of the realty and cannot be removed by the
lessee." Miller, 64 So. 2d at 743 (citing 32 Am. Jur. § 659).
CONCLUSION
The determination of the trial court was correct and its ruling should be affirmed.
*LW has no duty, under either the Lease Agreement or the common law, to repair or
replace the roof of the premises leased by the Griffithses. And, to paraphrase the Utah
Supreme Court in Wolfe v. White: The roof was out of good condition and repair. Who
was to put it in? Clearly, the Griffithses were to "put it in" because they covenanted in
the Lease Agreement to maintain the roof, to keep it in repair, and, where necessary, to
put it into repair.
DATED this /nf

day of March, 1998.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
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